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WILLS AND TRUSTS
COLE3AN KAIESH
CONSTRUCTION-ORIGINAL OR
SUBSTITUTIONAL GIFT
In Dozier v. Able,:1 the issue in the construction of a will was
whether an alternative gift was original or substitutional. The
pertinent language of the will was:
I will . . .all the rest and residue of my estate . . .unto
all of my first cousins and my aunt, Mrs. Connie Crisp, the
children of the said Connie Crisp not to share in the distribu-
tion and not to have any part of my estate, the same to be
divided among my first cousins other than the children of
the said Connie Crisp, and the said Mrs. Connie Crisp, equal-
ly and share and share alike. And in case of the death of any
of said devisees, before my death, then and in that event the
child or children of such deceased devisee to take the portion
the parent would have taken if living at my death.
The testator had fifty-four first cousins. Of these twenty-two
survived him. Twenty-three first cousins died prior to the mak-
ing of the will, most of them leaving children. Seven first cousins
died after the making of the will and before the testator's death,
as did the aunt, Connie Crisp. All left children.
The issue was whether the children of the first cousins who
had died prior to the making of the will were entitled to share.
In an elaborate decree, ranging widely among the authorities, the
trial judge concluded that the alternative gift was original and
direct, and not substitutional. The result was reached primarily
on what the court discerned to be the testator's intention in the
light of what it concluded was the better and preponderant view:
that as a rule of construction a gift to the issue of a class by way
of alternative was original and would thus include the issue of a
member of a class dead at the making of the will. The trial
judge treated several South Carolina cases as tending to support
the rule. 2 Accordingly, the decree held that the issue of first
1. 241 S.C. 358, 128 S.E.2d 682 (1963).
2. Citing in particular, Britton v. Johnson, 2 Hill Equity 430 (1836); Dun-
can v. Harper, 4 S.C. 76 (1872). Britton v. Johnson was cited, the judge
pointed out, in AmERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, Vol. V, 405-408 (1952), as sup-
porting the original gift construction. The author of the text himself justified
this position in this way: "Thus, in the absence of factors pointing to a con-
trary result, it should always be assumed that in making an alternative gift
in favor of the issue of any deceased person, otherwise within the class, the
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cousins dead when the will was made would take together with
surviving first cousins and the issue of first cousins dying between
the date of the will's making and the testator's death. In addi-
tion, it was held that the children of the aunt, who predeceased
the testator, would take under the provisional clause.
On appeal the Supreme Court reversed as to the issue of first
cousins who had died before the making of the will. The court
noted that there is sometimes ambiguity as to whether the testa-
tor intended to benefit the issue of beneficiaries dead before the
will, and it recognized the two lines of authority on the subject:
that favoring the original gift concept, and the other adopting
the substitutional view. The court's position was that there was
no South Carolina commitment to either of the rules,3 but it
stated that it was relieved of the necessity of accepting one rule
or the other because of what it regarded as the unmistakable and
unambiguous intention of the testator. This intention was found
in the words of the alternative provision "said devisees" and "of
such deceased devisee." The respondents, the court said "simply
do not meet the description of the class of children entitled to the
alternative or substitutional clauses, whichever it may be termed.
They are children of deceased devisees. . . . Patently, deceased
devisee and deceased first cousin are not synonymous terms, as
they must be read if respondents are to be included in the descrip-
tion of the class. To so construe them thwarts testator's deliber-
ate choice of the words devisees and devisee to express their or-
dinary meaning."
DISQUALIFICATION OF EXECUTOR
In C rant vt. Osgood,5 the novel question arose whether a pro-
bate judge could refuse to qualify and grant letters testamentary
to an executor on the ground of unfitness. The question, while
raised and disposed of by the probate court and by the circuit
court, was treated on appeal as moot and speculative in the light
of developed facts, here later mentioned.
Briefly, the facts in the case were that the plaintiff and the de-
fendant, children of the testatrix, were named executrix and exe-
object of the testator is to assure equal division among the branches of his
relations designated, and the branch represented by the issue of a class member
dead when the will was executed is just as important to the testator as the
issue of any other class member who dies later."
3. This would rule out Britton v. Johnson, note 2 supra, as being definitive
on the question of which line of authority was followed.
4. 241 S.C. 104, 127 S.E.2d 202 (1962).
5. Transcript of Record, particularly order of probate judge, pp. 112-116.
1963]
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cutor of the will in which they were named life beneficiaries.
They were also named trustees. The plaintiff filed the will for
probate in common form, together with a caveat and petition
seeking a disqualification by the probate court of her brother as
co-executor on the ground of his unfitness. The defendant, answer-
ing the petition, denied the power and jurisdiction of the pro-
bate court to disqualify him. The probate judge overruled the
jurisdictional objection and took testimony as to the alleged un-
fitness, concluded that the defendant was unfit, and denied him
the right to qualify. According to the record, the unsuitability
of the defendant to act was demonstrated by a history of dis-
soluteness, non-support of a former wife on account of which he
has been arrested, indictments for failure to pay federal taxes
and to make returns, and financial irresponsibility. The probate
judge's basic position was that his right to disqualify an executor
and to deny him letters was co-equal with his right to refuse let-
ters of administration on an intestate estate to an applicant for
that office. The trial judge reversed the probate judge, holding
that the latter possessed no power to deny letters to the person
named as executor by the testator if the nominee was not incom-
petent by reason of minority6 or insanity.
An appeal followed. The appellant proposed to include in the
record of the case a statement to the effect that shortly after the
rendition of the decree the respondent had filed a petition to
have the will proved in solemn form, the petitioner asserting his
status to be that of a "person interested to invalidate such al-
leged will." The trial judge refused to order the requested in-
clusion, and this action on his part was alleged to be error. To
this position the Supreme Court agreed and reversed the lower
court.
The Supreme Court pointed out that the only issue raised by
the principal appeal was whether the probate court had the au-
thority to refuse letters testamentary to the person named in the
will as executor, but it concluded that under the facts relating to
the attempt to invalidate the will the question of this authority
had become "speculative, if not moot, at the present time." Itsrea-
son for so deciding was that the respondent executor, whose oath
on qualifying required him to state that the instrument to be pro-
pounded was the will of the decedent and that he, as executor,
6. A minor is specifically denied by statute the right to act as executor.
S.C. CODE § 19-417 (1962).
[Vol. 16
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would "well and truly execute the same,' 7 was violating his oath
and trust in attacking the will. The court declared: "It is in-
conceivable that one should be allowed to accept a trust, take a
solemn oath to execute the same, and, in the same breath and at
the same time, attack the instrument which created the trust, as
being invalid." The court thereupon, following the lead of au-
thorities elsewhere, stated the rule to be that an attack upon the
validity of a will by the executor amounted to a renunciation
of the office, and that so long as the respondent was opposing the
will refusal to qualify him was justified. It declined, in the state
of the record, to pass upon the question whether the renuncia-
tion could be retracted. The court concluded that the respondent,
by his attack upon the will, had rendered the decree of the circuit
judge inoperative, and that "it is, to say the least, speculative
as to whether any judgment on the part of this court at the
present time, either affirming or reversing the circuit judge in this
particular, could ever be finally effective or operative." The
court then declared that it left undecided the issue raised by the
appeal and reversed the trial judge in his settling of the case for
appeal, and remanded for further proceedings.8
7. Quoting from S.C. CODE § 19432 (1952). The same language is in the
same numbered statute in the 1962 Code.
8. Since the Supreme Court did not, for the reasons it stated, pass upon the
principal issue raised by the appeal, any discussion of this moot or speculative
issue would take on the same character. It might not be amiss, however, to
point out that the probate judge's assumption of authority to refuse to qualify
a named executor was a breaking of new ground and without local precedent.
His justification was that he had the same right to refuse letters to an unfit
executor as he had to an unfit applicant for letters of administration. How-
ever, it is easily discernible that, unlike an administrator, an executor does
not derive his authority solely from the probate court, nor is he a deputy
or officer of that court, as is the former. The cases cited by the probate
judge to support his position were three: in two of them, Ex Parte Small,
69 S.C. 43, 48 S.E. 40 (1903), and Ex Parte Talbert, 206 S.C. 300, 34 S.E.2d
49 (1944), it was held that the right to letters of administration on an intestate
estate was not absolute. (See, also, to same effect, Rowell v. Adams, 83 S.C.
124, 65 S.E. 207 (1909). The third of the cases, Stairley v. Rabe, McMullan
Equity 22 (1840), wasone in which the court of equity held that it could, and
would, appoint a receiver of the testate estate involved where the executrix was
married, a second time, to a husband whose circumstances were necessitous
and who was mismanaging the estate. It is to be noted that in the last case,
the question was not one of refusing to qualify the executor, but of deprivation
of the power to act-and in this respect the court did not vacate the office
and remove the representative but appointed a receiver to assume control of the
estate. It does not follow logically, or by analogy, as the probate court
stated, that these cases justify refusal to qualify in the first instance. It must
be admitted that there is some judicial approval of a principle that if the
probate court can revoke letters of administration it can deny them at the
outset. See Ex Parte Small, supra, where it is said: "It would be a curious
rule which would allow the revocation of administration for cause and would
not allow its denial for like cause." But this presupposes that, in the case of
a will, the probate court has power to revoke letters testamentary for cause.
1963]
4
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 16, Iss. 1 [], Art. 21
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol16/iss1/21
SouTH CAROLINA LAW REv[mV.w
CONCLUSIVENESS OF FOREIGN PROBATE
A case of far-reaching importance on the question of the con-
clusiveness in this state of the probate of a will probated at the
testator's domicile is Tripp v. Tiipp.9 The decedent was domicil-
ed in Ohio. He had left a will in which his wife was named sole
beneficiary and executrix. A few days after making the will the
testator conveyed to his wife real estate in Spartanburg County,
South Carolina, which comprised the bulk of his property. He
owned, at the time of his death, personal property in Ohio and
South Carolina. The wife probated the will in Ohio. The appel-
lant in this case was the only child of the decedent by a former
marriage and resided in Michigan. In the probate proceedings
That is not the case. In fact, not only does the probate court not have the
power to remove an executor, except under a few narrowly confined statutes
(§§ 19-597, 19-598, 19-599-change of domicile outside of state or absence for
five months [provided as equivalent of a renunciation] ; § 19-532-Failure to
make returns; §§ 19-452, 19-453-failure to file proper petition and inventory),
but the court of equity likewise lacks the power to remove. The court of
equity can, however, accomplish the same thing-i.e., prevent an unfit repre-
sentative from acting-by the appointment of a receiver. Osborne v. Black,
Speers Equity 431 (1844); Ex parte Galluchat, 1 Hill Equity 148 (1833);
Stairley v. Rabe, supra; Harman v. Wagener, 33 S.C. 487, 12 S.E. 98 (1890);
Griffith v. Frazer, 8 Cranch 9, 3 L.Ed. 471 (1814). See, also, Edmonds v.
Cranshaw, Harper Equity 225 (1824); Anderson v. Butler, 31 S.C. 183,
9 S.E. 797 (1889); Campbell v. Bank of Charleston, 3 S.C. 384 (1871);
Witherspoon v. Watts, 18 S.C. 396 (1882) ; Higginson v. Fabre, 3 DeSaussure
89 (1810) ; Smith v. Heyward, 115 S.C. 145, 104 S.E. 473 (1920). It is not
quite so clear whether, there is a co-executor guilty of mismanagement, a
receiver would be appointed who would supplant both executors; or whether
the properly acting executor would himself be appointed receiver; or whether
the unsuitable co-executor would simply be restrained from interfering with
sole control and management by the other. See Smith v. Heyward, supra.
The weight of authority elsewhere is clearly opposed to sanction in the
absence of statute, to a probate court to refuse letters testamentary to an
executor who, in his judgment, is unsuitable for the office. 95 A.L.R. 828;
ATKxiNsoN ON WILLs, § 108, p. 604 (2d ed., 1953).
In his order the judge of probate also denied the respondent "the right to
qualify as Testamentary Trustee thereof [the will.]," Transcript of Record,
p. 116. Appeal was also made against this portion of the order. In view of
the Supreme Court's treatment of the case, this issue seems also to have be-
come moot, but the interesting question arises whether the probate judge was
within his authority in this action. Since, unlike an administrator or an execu-
tor, a testamentary trustee receives no letters of trusteeship or similar letters,
it is difficult to see how the order could have any effect in this regard. Wheth-
er, by renouncing by operation of lav his executorship by contesting the will,
the executor-trustee also renounced his trusteeship is a question that may yet
have to be resolved in the case. In the ordinary case, the renunciation volun-
tarily of one office is not a renunciation of the other. Ashe v. Ashe, Richard-
son's Eauity Cases 380 (1832) ; Mordecai v. Schrimer, 38 S.C. 294, 16 S.E.
889 (1892). It would seem, in any event, however, that even if the renunci-
ation of the executorship would not carry with it a similar renunciation of the
trusteeship, a court of equity could for cause remove the trustee-that is, cause,
if the facts alleged by the co-executor-trustee were true, which would warrant
removal.
9. 240 S.C. 334, 126 S.E.2d 9 (1962).
[Vol. :16
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pursuant to Ohio law the appellant was not given formal notice
of the proceeding but had actual notice of its pendency. He made
no appearance. The time for attacking the will under Ohio law
lapsed. Thereafter the appellant had an exemplified copy of the
will filed in Spartanburg County, following refusal by the exe-
cutrix of his request that she do so. Thus exemplified the will was
admitted to probate in common form, and within the statutory
period allowed for instituting proceedings in solemn form he
initiated such proceedings. The respondent, the wife, made a
special appearance to object to the authority of the probate
court to entertain the proceedings, on the ground that the lapse
of time barring an attack upon the will in Ohio was sufficient to
render conclusive the validity of the will. The probate court ac-
ceded to this contention but declared that ancillary jurisdiction
would be retained. In this holding it was sustained by the cir-
cuit court. The Supreme Court affirmed.
The principal issue was whether Section 19-286 of the 1952
Code (the same in 1962) precluded an attack upon the will.10 The
respondent's contention was that the language of the proviso in
the statute relating to proof in solemn form was to be taken lit-
erally, and that since no such proceedings were had in Ohio he
was not debarred from contesting the will. The opposing con-
tention, in which there was judicial concurrence at all levels,
was that the will could be attacked in this state only so long as
it was open to attack in the foreign state. In affirming the lower
court, the Supreme Court pointed out that Ohio does not have a
solemn form proceeding and that there was no reason to dis-
criminate between states having such proceedings as a form of
contest and those that did not. It further pointed out that in
South Carolina immunity from attack resulted not only where
the will had been subjected to contest in solemn form and had
been upheld but also where no solemn form proceedings were
brought within the time permitted by statute."' The court's con-
clusion on this pivotal issue was that "Since any other interpre-
10. The statute reads: "If a will be regularly proved in any foreign court
an exemplification of such will may be admitted to probate in this State upon
the exemplification and certificate of the judge of probate and the exemplifi-
cation shall also be evidence of the devise of lands in this State when the
title of lands comes in question; provided, that if the will be not proved in
solemn form the parties interested against the will shall not be concluded by
such probate but may examine witnesses as to the sanity of the testator or
as to any fraud or imposition practiced upon him in obtaining the will and the
other side may apply for an order to perpetuate testimony in support of the
will."
11. S.C. CODE § 19-255 (1952-also 1962).
1963]
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tation would lead to an unreasonable result, it would seem that
by the use of the words 'solemn form' in the proviso to Section
19-286 the legislature intended reference to the point at which by
the laws of the foreign state the will should attain immunity
from attack, rather than to the means by which such point of
finality should be reached.1 12
The appellant also claimed a violation of constitutional due
process in the Ohio probate proceedings, but, without going here
into the constitutional ramifications, the court upheld the valid-
ity of the proceedings. It further observed that as a matter of
comity, reflected in the statute itself, it would respect the uncon-
tested decree of probate by the Ohio court.
Finally, the court disposed of the appellant's contention that
the lower court improperly held that the decedent owned no real
estate in South Carolina at his death, "thereby ignoring or pre-
judging the action pending by the appellant against the respon-
dent to set aside for mental incapacity and undue influence de-
cedent's deed, executed shortly before his death, purporting to
convey to her his South Carolina real estate." The court held
that nothing in the proceedings in either the probate or circuit
12. The original of the statute goes back to 1759, 4 STAT. 102, and its pur-
pose was to dispense with the production of the original will, where land was
involved, and to permit in its place an exemplified copy of the will probated in
the foreign jurisdiction. It contained a proviso that the heir at law might
contest the will for insanity, fraud or imposition. No mention was made of
proof in solemn form. Nor was such mention then necessary, since with re-
spect to lands the proof of the will in either common or solemn form in the
eccelesiastical or similar court established its validity only as to personal prop-
erty. In South Carolina this was true until 1858 when a statute was enacted
providing that no devise of real estate should be admitted in evidence in any
case until after probate in one of the two forms, and that the probate should be
"good, sufficient and effectual in law" as if the will were exclusively of
personalty. 22 STAT. 701; S.C. CODE § 19-408 (1962). Even though a will of
real and personal property had been admitted to probate, yet in an action
concerning the real estate the will had to be proved de novo. Brown v. Gibson,
1 Nott & McCord 326 (1818). And where a will had been admitted in com-
mon or solemn form, and in the latter case thus immune to attack, the im-
munity extended only to personal property and did not bind the heir. Tygart v.
Peeples, 9 Richardson's Equity 46 (1856).
The present form of the statute is verbatim with the language of the General
and Revised Statutes of the 1870's in which mention of solemn form pro-
ceedings by way of proviso is first made-which is understandable in the light
of the previously enacted legislation of 1858. It is debatable whether, from
the history of the statute, it is intended to cover cases of dispositions other than
devises. The contrary seems to be held, however,-i.e., that the statute also
applies to personal property-in Collins v. Collins, 219 S.C. 1, 63 S.E.2d 811
(1951). With all due respect to the logic of the court in this case it is open
to argument whether, when the legislature used "solemn form" it did not mean
just that-the full dress proceeding that called in the parties and the witnesses
to the will and made the will sacred if the proponent prevailed, and not the
unassailable common-form-proved-will which attained that status by inaction and
lapse of time.
[Vol. 16
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court warranted that conclusion, and that the deed, although
under attack, was to be regarded as valid until adjudged other-
wise; that the circuit court's statement that the decedent was not
seized of real estate in South Carolina was correct but did not
have the effect of prejudging the action. It is not clear, at least
to the writer, how the respondent could attack the deed, since,
until the will was set aside, the real estate conveyed was not a part
of the decedent's estate, unless it was so by relation back in the
double event of a successful attack upon the will and a similarly
successful attack by the son as an heir at law.
Since, while not prejudging the outcome of the action concern-
ing the deed, there was holding that the real estate was not owned
by the decedent at his death, it becomes uncertain whether the
scope of the Supreme Court's decision extends to forbidding at-
tack on a foreign will, no longer open to contest in the domicili-
ary state for lack of suit within the proper time (or, for that
matter, if the will had been unsuccessfully contested), insofar
as real estate in this state is concerned. The reasonable conclusion,
however, which the case compels is that once a will is admitted
to probate in the domicile of the testator and has been unsucces-
fully contested there or cannot, because of the passage of time,
be contested, its probate is conclusive as to both personalty and
real estate.
TRUSTS-PRINCIPAL OR INCOME
In Cothran v. South Carolina National Bank, 3 the court was
faced with the problem of whether stock dividends and profits
realized by a trustee from the sale of stock were to be treated as
principal or as subject to apportionment as between principal
and income. The case is a significant one, but its impact is con-
siderably lessened--except as to the parties involved-by the
passage of legislation hereafter noted under Legislation.
The case dealt with a will which created a trust under which
the trustees were directed to pay "all the net income" to two life
beneficiaries, and upon the death of one "all the net income" was
to be paid to the survivor for life. Much of the case was involved
with pleading and procedural skirmishes, but on the substance of
the case both the lower court and the Supreme Court held that
stock dividends paid to the trustee and profits realized by it on
the sale of stock did not go as principal but were subject to ap-
portionment.
13. 242 S.C. 80, 130 S.E.2d 177 (1963).
19631
8
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 16, Iss. 1 [], Art. 21
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol16/iss1/21
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REviW[
The Supreme Court noted the three basic rules with respect to
the allotment of dividends: (1) the Massachusetts rule, (2) the
Pennsylvania rule, and (3) the Kentucky rule. Both the lower
court and the Supreme Court determined, on the basis of earlier
South Carolina decisions' 4 that the Pennsylvania, or apportion-
ment, rule applied, the Supreme Court characterizing the rule
as follows:
Under the so-called Pennsylvania rule, or apportionment
rule, it is the source of the stock benefit, and not its form,
which determines to what extent it shall be treated as income
or corpus of the estate. This rule treats all declared dividends
whether in cash or stock, as income to the life beneficiaries
to the extent that the earnings from which the dividend is
declared accumulated since the acquisition of the stock by
the trustee.
As to the sale of stock by the trustee, the court declared that
the Pennsylvania rule
also treats either profits from the sale of stock by the trustee
during the life tenancy, or profits from the liquidation of
the stock by the corporation during such period, as appor-
tionable between the life tenant and the remaindermen, if
the profit was due to accumulation of earnings by the cor-
poration. The foregoing rule is based on maintaining the
'intact value' of the stock as part of the corpus for the re-
mainderman and giving the accretion to the life tenant.15
The South Carolina authority on which the court chiefly re-
lied was Wallace v. "Wallace,16 in which the words of payment to
life tenant were "interest, income or profits." There, as in the
present case, stock of the trust which had considerably increased
in value because of accumulation of earnings "represented in
part by extra shares declared as stock dividends and in part by
increase in book value of the shares," was sold by the trustee
after the life tenant's death. The ruling there of the circuit judge,
14. Cobb v. Fant, 36 S.C. 1, 14 S.E. 959 (1891); Wallace v. Wallace, 90
S.C. 61, 72 S.E. 553 (1911) ; Gist v. Craig, 142 S.C. 407, 141 S.E. 26 (1927).
15. It has been pointed out that "by the weight of authority, even in states
which follow the Pennsylvania rule as to extraordinary dividends, there is no
apportionment of the proceeds of a sale of the shares by the trustee, al-
though the proceeds are greater than they would have been if the corporation
had not retained earnings accruing since the creation of the trust." ScoTT ON
TRUSTS § 236.12 (2d ed. 1956).
16. Note 14 Supra.
[Vol. 16
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which was approved on appeal, noted that while there was con-
flict in the authorities it was his opinion that
the strongest consideration of reason and justice support the
rule which apportions such dividends or earnings between
life tenant and remaindermen according to the time when
the earnings were made, and not according to the chance
action of corporate officers in withholding or declaring
dividends; and I think that upon the sale of the stock, as
here, in which the funds of the life estate have been invested,
the increment in value due to the undivided profits or sur-
plus earned and to the credit of the stock, though not de-
clared by the corporation as dividends should be awarded
to the life tenant.
This approved ruling was based not only on what was thought
to be the desirable attitude in such a situation but upon a holding
in Cobb v. Fant,17 in which profits received by the trustee upon
liquidation of the corporation whose stocks were in the trust were
held to be income, restricted to profits accruing after the execu-
tion of the trust deed. In addition, in Cobb the circuit court was
held to have been correct in holding that "cash dividends, extra
dividends, or bonuses, declared from the earnings of a corpora-
tion are income and go to the cestui gue trust." In Gist v. Craig,18
which followed Wallace in time, the court reviewed these earlier
South Carolina authorities and stated the principles they were
supposed to have laid down. The court listed four classes of
accretion cases: (1) declaration of stock dividends; (2) liquida-
tion and distribution of assets; (3) sale by the trustee, or by the
life tenant in corporation with the remainderman, and conver-
sion into cash; (4) "Where the corporation has not converted
its accretions into a stock dividend, or declared a dividend in
cash representing them, or is not in the process of liquidation,
but is a going concern, holding among its assets such surplus and
undivided profits, and where there has been no sale of the stock
by the trustee or the life beneficiary and the remainderman."
Of this classification the court in Gist said: "We may concede
(though not to be understood as doing so) that under the first
three classes, the life tenant would be entitled to the benefit of
the accretions, without in the slightest degree affecting our posi-
tion to the rights under the fourth class." The court put into the
17. Note 14 Supra.
18. Note 14 Supra.
1963]
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fourth class a number of shares of stock which, at time of the
testator's death had a book value of $102, and at the life tenant's
death had a book value of $240. These shares had not been sold.
It was held that the shares in their increased state passed as
principal.1 Other shares which had been redeemed by the cor-
poration during the life tenant's life were treated differently:
the increase going to the life tenant. Although the life and re-
mainder interests were not in trust, but were legal estates, the
same principles were held to apply.
There were other features in the present case, principally
assertions by the appellant that the parties did not understand
or intend, and that the testator did not intend, the accretions to
be treated as income. On this score the court held that under the
authorities the language of the will was unambiguous and must
have been understood in the light of the antecedent authorities,
particularly since the will was drawn by "an attorney experi-
enced in trust matters," and that any departure from the terms
of the trust by the trustee on the basis of what it regarded as its
powers and duties could not vary the terms of the trust or absolve
that trustee of its responsibilities. There was also assertion that
the surviving life tenant was estopped by certain conduct on her
part, but, without going into the facti here, it was held that the
elements of estoppel were not present.
LEGISLATION
The only significant legislation in the area of Wills and Trusts
enacted by the 1963 General Assembly is directly related to the
problems in the case just discussed. It is the Revised Uniform
Principal and Income Act, which was approved on June 3, 1963.20
Although the act is a revised Uniform Act, the original act was
not adopted in this state, and the revised act is the first act on
the subject. In the case just discussed, the court points out that
the Uniform Act (not the revised act), if it had been in force
before creation of the trust, might have compelled a different
result. With respect to the particular features involved in the
litigation, the revised act makes no change in the original act--
19. The writer confesses that he cannot understand why if the securities in
specie were turned over to the remainderman he could keep them, as increased
in value, but that if the trustee sold them the accretion would go to the life
tenant, or at least be apportioned. If a legal life tenant were given a power of
sale and sold property and with proceeds bought other property, which he
thereafter sold at a profit, a retention of the profit by him would hardly seem
in order.
20. Act No. 269, 53 STAT. 297.
[Vol. 16
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that is to say, as to the treatment of stock dividends and the
proceeds of sale of stock. Both are treated as principal. Section
3(b) (4) includes under principal "stock dividends, receipts on
liquidation of a corporation, x x." Section 3(b) (1) includes
under principal "consideration received by the trustee on the sale
or other transfer of principal or on repayment of a loan or as a
replacement or change in the form of principal."
The quoted sections are but a small part of the whole area. The
revised act, as is suggested by the fact that it is a revision, takes
into account new practices in the corporate field since the enact-
ment of the original act and innovations in the field of invest-
ments. It also is designed to remove uncertainties and unsatis-
factory features of the older act. The act is too extensive in its
scope to justify discussion in these pages, but trust officers and
their lawyers and estate planners are by now familiar with its
provisions. The prime virtue of the act in South Carolina is that
it fills in many of the gaps that have heretofore existed. It will,
of course, change the law where in conflict, as in Cothran, al-
though it will not change the result there.
Of major importance are the provisions of Section 14: "Except
as specifically provided in the trust instrument or the will or in
this act, this act shall apply to any receipt or expense received
or incurred after the effective date of this act by any trust or
decedent's estate whether established before or after the effective
date of this act and whether the asset involved was acquired by
the trustee before or after the effective date of this act." It will
thus be seen that the act is retroactive in the sense that it applies
to trusts created prior to its effective date, but it does not apply
to receipts before that time. There is, of course, a constitutional
question, but the view of the Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws, concurring in that of the draftsman of the
act and the committee for the act, was that it would stand the
constitutional test. This position is based largely on the decisions
in In re Catherwood's Trust,21 and In re Allis' Will.22 (As ap-
plied to Cothran, the act would affect receipts and expenses not
yet received or incurred by the trustee.)
The original Principal and Income Act dealt with both legal
life interests and equitable life interests. The revised act deals
almost exclusively with life interests under a trust. Except for
Section 5, which deals with probate income-income during ad-
21. 405 Pa. 61, 173 A.2d (1961).
22. 6 Misc.2d 1, 94 N.W.2d 226, 69 A.L.R. 2d 1128 (1959).
19631
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ministration-and expenses during that period, the revised act
is limited to life interests under a trust. It should be kept in mind,
therefore, that the various rules for determining income and
principal, as prescribed by the act, do not govern where the life
interest is a legal one. Hence, it is possible that, because of the
statutory change, a different set of rules will apply to a legal
life estate than, under the act, will apply to an equitable life
estate. In South Carolina, apparently, under Gist, the same rules
for allocation were applicable to both types of estates. This will
no longer be true. The writer understands that there is under
consideration by the Conference of Commissioners of Uniform
State Laws a uniform act to cover legal life estates. Until such
an act or a similarly local one is promulgated and made law,
South Carolina practitioners must be cautious not to treat legal
life estates and trust life estates as subject to the same rules.
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